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In “a catch 22”, the
FDA has received
criticism for both
delaying the avail-
ability of new ther-
apies and for al-
lowing drugs and
devices to be ap-
proved before fully
documenting their
safety.was having a discussion about one of my pet peeves, the exportation of clinical re-
search (1), when the general topic of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and medical innovation came up. The FDA is responsible for the approval and
ontinued availability of cardiac drugs, biologicals, and devices, and its processes have
ecently received considerable attention in both the medical and lay press. My initial
nstinct was to regard the agency as an impediment to innovation. However, after having
one back and read some of the press pieces, it has become obvious that the role of the
DA is neither simple nor clear. The agency has the dual charge of seeing that effective
herapies are made available to patients as rapidly as possible while simultaneously ensur-
ng that those therapies are safe over the product lifecycle. In “a catch 22”, the FDA has
eceived criticism for both delaying the availability of new therapies and for allowing
rugs and devices to be approved before fully documenting their safety.
Although the FDA has long been criticized for over-regulation, more recently the pre-
ominant concern has been under-regulation. These concerns have particularly been fueled
y high-profile drug withdrawals, such as Vioxx. Concern regarding under-regulation was
erhaps best exemplified by a report on pharmaceutical regulation by the Institute of Medi-
ine (IOM) in 2006. This document indicated that “the drug safety system is impaired,” and
escribed “the perception of crisis that has compromised the credibility of the FDA and the
harmaceutical industry” (2). The recommendations included changes in organizational cul-
ure, a strengthening of science and expertise, an increase in regulatory authority, and an im-
rovement in communication. Given the stature of the IOM and the careful and extensive
rocess to create the report, these recommendations carried considerable weight.
Lately, worry of under-regulation has expanded to include the potential of undue in-
uence by industry. In a 2006 survey (3), nearly 20% of scientists employed by the FDA
ndicated that they had been requested to use nonscientific considerations in creating
cientific documents. More recently, FDA scientist Dr. David Graham (the whistle-
lower in the Vioxx affair), claimed that a report he had generated regarding possible
dverse effects from rosiglitazone was delayed from journal submission (4). Questions
ere raised as to whether the manufacturer (GlaxoSmithKline) knew of and communi-
ated the potential side effects in a timely manner, and whether in general the same
gency that approved a drug should be responsible for determining whether it should be
ithdrawn. Past panels recommending drug approval or writing guidelines for usage
ere frequently reported to have relations with the industry under consideration. Last
ear Dr. Sanjay Kaul was abruptly dismissed from an advisory panel after the maker of
he drug to be considered called the FDA to express concern regarding potential intel-
ectual bias on his part about study results that supported approval. The net effect of the
bove events has been to suggest that, far from over-regulation, the FDA may be unduly
oose in its oversight of medical therapies.
In contrast to the recent foregoing issues, concerns that over-regulation by the FDA
elays and perhaps even stifles the discovery and approval of new therapies have been
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Editor’s Page November 16, 2010:1761–2xpressed nearly continuously for many years. It has been
guesstimated” that only 20% of investigational drugs that
nter clinical trials actually achieve approval, and these at
cost of over $1 million. The process often requires
any years and several large clinical trials, and the length
f a typical FDA review when all data are completed
akes 6 to 12 months. Approval, when achieved, often
arries with it the requirement for specific product detail-
ng and/or the need for additional post-market studies.
necdotes exist regarding the changing of FDA personnel
r of criteria during the development of new agents. The
athway for devices is similar, and both differ radically
rom that of surgical procedures, which do not have a
rescribed approval process. Accordingly, the discovery
nd development of new therapeutics is a high-risk finan-
ial undertaking. Of significance, the nature of the ap-
roval process is somewhat different in Europe, as has
een evidenced by the availability of new devices, such as
rug-eluting stents and percutaneous heart valves, on that
ontinent.
As daunting as is the demonstration of efficacy, the
ssue of proving safety is often more so. Proving a nega-
ive, that is, that the therapy is free of adverse events, is
lways challenging. In fact, given the limited number of
ighly-specified patients enrolled in most studies, it is
ifficult to be certain of how an agent will behave in a
arger, general population. This, of course, is as great a
hallenge to the FDA as it is to the company developing
he agent or device. As has been pointed out on numer-
us occasions, the penalty for delaying or prohibiting the
pproval of an effective agent is nearly always much less
han that of making one available with significant toxicity.
nd so, the wheels sometimes seem to grind extremely
ne, but very slowly. The net effect of the foregoing is a
ense that the approval process represents a degree of
ver-regulation that could be lessened and accelerated.
Of perhaps greater relevance in regard to freedom from
dverse events is the question of how safe a new pharma-
eutical or device has to be. We in medicine live with
isk/benefit ratios all of the time, and we make reasoned
udgments accordingly. We understand that, in alleviating
ne problem, an agent may increase the chances of an-
ther (e.g., thrombolytic agents and stroke). Many get the
mpression that, in the quest for near absolute safety, the
DA may neglect the potential of benefit. I personally
now of a number of physicians who hoarded as much 4ioxx as they could find upon hearing that it would be
emoved from the market. They felt that at a low dose
he benefit more than outweighed the risk. It is often
uipped that aspirin could not be approved at the current
ime, and that penicillin, with a potential for allergic reac-
ions, might have a difficult time as well. Of course, we
ay well have foisted this posture on the FDA, since the
ccurrence of side effects draws much more attention than
he treatment of disease. It is in this sense that I worry
bout the potential for over-regulation by the FDA be-
ause there exists a possible under-emphasis of efficacy
ersus safety.
I have often heard it said that if both sides of an issue
re unhappy, you must be doing something right. I cer-
ainly admire the dedicated scientists and staff of the
DA, and I respect the very difficult task that they per-
orm well on a daily basis. They have their hands full bal-
ncing the efficacy and safety of new diagnostics and thera-
eutics, and striving for rapid benefits at minimal risk. They
ust walk the tightrope between over- and under-regulation.
t is probably not surprising that, in attempting to achieve
he proper balance, they disappoint parties on both sides.
hey are truly between a rock and a hard place. In my view,
ne concern is that the agency not overly emphasize risk
ver benefit. We count on them to provide us with a well-
efined profile of both potential toxicity and efficacy. It
hould then be up to us and our patients to make the most
easonable decision as to when and how to use the treat-
ent.
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